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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the Public Service Commission exceed its authority 
by approving the transfer of Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity No. 146 8 to Applicant? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Bob Bruce Construction (Applicant) is a South Dakota 
sole proprietorship. In early 1984 Applicant obtained the minor-
ity business subcontract (disadvantaged business enterprise or 
"DBE") with Keiwit Western Company for hauling excavation mater-
ials and asphalt on the 1984 Salt Lake City airport project, 
which had federal financing. Subsequently/ Applicant obtained a 
similar subcontract on road work being performed near Strawberry 
Reservoir by Staker Paving Co. (R-093-094) 
Applicant commenced work on the Salt Lake City airport 
project without any authority from the State of Utah to so do. 
Applicant then made arrangements to purchase the sand, gravel and 
asphalt authority of Kroon Trucking, Inc., certificate no. 1468, 
and made application to the Public Service Commission to approve 
the transfer of that authority to him. (R-094, 096) 
At the hearing on Applicant ' s appl ica t ion , the evidence 
most favorable to Applicant establ ished the following: 
a. Both Kiewit and Staker Paving removed Respondent 
from the above-stated jobs because of his failure 
to meet his financial obligations. At the time of 
- 2 -
this hearing litigation was pending on these mat-
ters. (T-65, 66, 92, 93, 94, R-033) 
b. Both Kiewit and Staker Paving were forced to pay 
some of Applicant's obligations to avoid having his 
creditors file liens against their respective pro-
jects. (T-53, 54, 65, 66) 
c. Applicant has a negative asset balance unless he 
can include as assets speculative damages he is 
seeking in the Kiewit, Staker Paving and other law 
suits. Even allowing such speculative assets, Ap-
plicant's asset balance is marginal. (Ex. 1, R-
050, 051, 052, 053, Ex. 4, R-086, 087) 
d. A major consideration of the Public Service Com-
mission in approving the transfer of authority to 
Applicant was his minority status as an Indian. 
(R-093, 097) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Commission erred in granting a transfer of a 
certificate of convenience and Necessity to a common motor car-
rier without a specific finding that the carrier in question had 
"the financial ability . . . to properly perform the service 
sought under the certificate" as required by Utah Code Ann. Sec-
tion 54-6-5 (1953) as amended. 
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2. The Commission erred in granting a transfer of a 
certificate of convenience and necessity to a common carrier when 
the evidence submitted by that carrier clearly demonstrated that 
it did not have "the financial ability . . . to properly perform 
the service sought under the certificate." 
3. The Commission erred in granting a Transfer of cer-
tificate of convenience and necessity to a common motor carrier 
based on the minority status of that carrier. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRI-
CIOUSLY IN APPROVING APPLICANT'S APPLICATION 
WITHOUT A SPECIFIC FINDING THAT APPLICANT WAS 
FINANCIALLY CAPABLE OF PERFORMING THE SERVICE 
FOR WHICH AUTHORITY WAS BEING REQUESTED. 
Applicant's status as disadvantaged minority was bene-
ficial to him in obtaining a subcontract on a federally funded 
project. Howeverf Utah law has no provisions discriminating in 
favor of minorities. Utah law is couched in terms calculated to 
protect the consumer. Section 54-6-5, UCA 1953, as amended/ re-
quires the Public Service Commission to refuse authority to an 
Applicant if the Commission "finds that the Applicant is finan-
cially unable to properly perform the service sought under the 
certificate. . ." By negative implication/ the Commission must 
affirmatively determine that an Applicant £an financially perform 
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the service for which he seeks authority before granting a certi-
ficant of convenience and necessity. 
Section 54-6-5, in pertinent partf states: 
Before granting a certificate to a common mo-
tor carrier, the commission shall take into 
Consideration tilS financial ability Qf the 
Applicant to properly perform thfi service 
.aoiisJit under the certificate and also the 
character of the highway over which said com-
mon motor carrier proposes to operate and the 
effect thereon, and upon the traveling public 
using the same, and also the existing trans-
portation facilities in the territory pro-
posed to be served. If the commission finds 
that the Applicant is financially unable to 
properly perform the service sought under the 
certificate! or that the highway over which 
he proposes to operate is already sufficient-
ly burdened with traffic, or that the grant-
ing of the certificate applied for will be 
detrimental to the best interests of the peo-
ple of the state of Utah, Lh& commission 
shall not grant such certificate! [Emphasis 
added.] 
From its terms, 54-6-5 clearly requires the Public Ser-
vice Commission to have before it financial evidence from which 
it can conclude that an Applicant is financially able to perform 
the service for which it is seeking authority or the application 
must be denied. Absent such evidence, an order approving a grant 
of authority is arbitrary and capricious. 
In its Report and Order of April 9, 1985, the Public 
Service Commission makes the following Finding of Fact: 
Finding of Fact 5. The Division opposes the 
application on grounds the Applicant is not 
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f i n a n c i a l l y f i t . . . . At best we must f ind 
the D i v i s i o n ' s evidence on f inanc ia l f i t n e s s 
inconc lus ive . 
Finding of Fact 5 i s t he only Finding of Fact made by 
the Commission on f inanc ia l f i t n e s s . 
This court has previously determined the "Findings of 
Fact" which must be iik h^ PuhJir Service Commission i f i t s 
orders a re to be susta ined. In the case of Mountain States Legal 
E£iujidaliiaiL-y,i- Utah Public Service Commissionr 63 6 p. 2d 1047, 
1051-1052 (1981) the count stated: 
It is, therefore^ the responsibility of this 
Court to determine whether the Commission 
acted outside its jurisdiction, in excess of 
its lawful powers, or in a manner which is 
arbitrary and capricious and therefore with-
out legal justification. To enable this 
Court to determine whether an order is arbi-
trary and capricious, the Commission must 
make findings of fact which are sufficiently 
detailed to apprise the parties and Court of 
the basis for the Commission^ deci-
sion. . . . For this Court to sustain an 
order, the findings must be sufficiently 
detailed to demonstrate that the Commission 
has properly arrived at the ultimate factual 
findings and has properly applied the govern-
ing rules of law to those findings. Ultimate 
findings . . . must be sustained if there are 
adequate subordinate findings to support 
them, and there is substantial evidence to 
support the findings. 
It is respectfully submitted that I n light of its Fi i id-
ings of Fact, in which it omits a finding that Applicant is 
financial able to perform thu service toi which it is seeking 
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authorityf the Public Service Commission order of April 9, 1985, 
is arbitrary and capricious. 
POINT II 
APPLICANT'S EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATES THAT APPLI-
CANT IS NOT FINANCIALLY FIT TO OPERATE AS A 
COMMON MOTOR CARRIER FOR HIRE. 
As stated above, plaintiff believes that the Public 
Service Commission's failure to make adequate Findings of Fact is 
fatal to its order. However, even if that were not the case, Ap-
plicant's evidence clearly demonstrates that Applicant "is finan-
cial unable to properly perform the service sought," by the re-
quested transfer of authority. The ICC Motor Carrier Act of 193 5 
delineates some of the criteria for determining financial worthi-
ness. They are: 
a. Liquidity: Does the carrier have enough 
current assets on hand (e.g. cash) to meet 
the expected current expenses of the proposed 
operation (e.g. wages, fuel costs, tolls, 
etc.) 
b. Leverage: What proportion of the car-
rier's proposed service is financed with debt 
capital (e.g. bank loans)? The higher the 
proportion of debt to equity financing a car-
rier has, the greater the probability it will 
have to cease operation during periods of 
revenue decrease. The reason for this is 
that a firm is legally obligated to meet its 
interest payments (debt holders can force a 
firm to sell its assets) whereas it does not 
have the same obligation to those who pro-
vided equity capital (e.g. stockholders) to 
pay dividends on their investment. 
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c. Efficiency: How efficient is the car-
rier's management with respect to maintaining 
the proper inventory of equipment, utili-
zation of equipment, and collecting accounts 
receivable? 
cL Profitability: Does the carrier expect 
to make a reasonable profit through its 
operation? 
Eagle Motor Lines, 117 M . C . C . 30 (1972); 
Consolidated CarrierBt—InCi-f 13 1 M.c.c. 104, 
108 (1978) . 
In determining how Applicant stacks up with respect to 
these criteria (in terms most advantageous to Applicantf i*e.f 
disr ecjarditiu the Division's Exhibit 4 as the Commission did in 
its Finding of Facts, Report dtid Older OJ A|,JI IJ ••, I 985) it is 
appropriate to analyze his financial statements as reflected by 
Exhibit 1 an'J the ieeoi;d, pp. 046-053. In this analysis we refer 
to Managerial Finance. Dryden Pressr Hinsdale, Illinois ( 7th 
Ed.)f 1981, At page 139, the author develops the thesis that the 
most commonly used measure of liquidity is the current ratio, the 
ratio of current assets to current liabilities/ where current 
assets include cash, marketable securities, accounts receivable, 
and inventories, and current liabilities include accounts pay-
able, short term notes payable, current maturities of long i.erm 
debt, accrued income taxes, and other expenses* It is used to 
measure short term solvency since it "Indicates the extent to 
which the claims of short term creditors are covered by assets 
that are expected to l>e converted to cash in a period roughly 
8 -
corresponding to the maturity of the claims." Applying this 
formula to Applicant's Exhibit 1 and oral evidence gives the 
following: 
Current = current assets = $150.720 1 = 1.01 
ra t io current l i a b i l i t i e s $148,630 2 
1 Total Current Assets — R.049 
2 Total Current Liabilities — R.050 
Using the evidence most favorable to the Applicant, we 
find that he barely has sufficient current assets to cover his 
current liabilities. If he has any setbacks in his business 
operations at all, or if he is forced to pay some of his disputed 
liabilities, he will not be able to meet his current obligations. 
Two other common measures of leverage are the Times 
Interest Earned ratio and the Cash Flow Coverage ratio. The 
Times Interest ratio measures the extent to which earnings can 
decline without resultant financial embarrassment to the firm 
because of its inability to meet is annual interest costs. The 
Cash Flow Coverage ratio indicates the ratio of cash inflows to 
fixed charges. A value of about 2.0 is a minimum for a finan-
cially stable company, because it allows for a substantial de-
cline of cash inflows before the firm becomes insolvent. !&*_ at 
141-142. An analysis of Applicant's financial data using this 
method results in the following: 
Times £fill 5 $17r911 6 
Interest = = = 1.14 
Earned interest $15,751 7 
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5 Earnings Before I n t e r e s t and Taxes 
6 Net Income R. 51 
7 i n t e r e s t R. 51 
I in in Jl I (~" i * !, i i „'" in r ' \i f>> i «-i:.i I 11 I h e A p p i i c a n f s f o r t u n e ! : i . . 
he w i l l probably not; be ab l e to pay i t s i n t e i e s t diatufefa. Th A . 
suggests th,^ +- h* is highly leveraged relative to his income 
l e v e l , wh ich nu •., n 11 „.:. I i i t H J k ' i h i I I HI-1!! I I > Applicant i s very 
r i s k y , VOL example; 
Cash xfffifiiuifi. $512,108 8 
Plow = J 3 
Coverage f i xed charges + "ILi 
debt repayment 
° Gross Income f . u n 
Contract haul ing ($366,0 ' /^ -i cu r i eaL p u i t i o n long term debt 
($6,499) + i n t e r e s t ($15,751) 
VI 1111IIi« I 11hstanf i a 11 in i im t11<:» "»sai e * va j ue of 
2 ,0 i n,di ca t i n y
 r d ga » 11 f Ih d * t (-1 i ca11" . , . , i • ' ' 
a b i l i t y to remain s o l v e n t , 
Ii i imp 11 in I im i HI I I i pff iciency nn I he ba s i s of 
t he m a t e r i a l s in tlie record* 1 ul Hie Lmilinja - , ' 1 i "i pvi i " 
prof i t a b i 1 i iy ar e s i gn i f ica n r The ROI ine a s ur es th e r e t u c n oi i 
t he a s s e t s inves t,e,i„I | I, i l 
net income i i l ^ M l 12 
ROI « = = o,35% 
t o t a l a s s e t s $188,765 13 
12 Net Income R. 51 
13 T o t a l L i a b i l i t i e s a n d P r o p r i e t o r ' & C a p i t a l R.50 
11, ii* ahock irn,;( In,11! • 1 Ih | T nf 1t \ I i l l * . , " Rppl i ' \ v ,lh 
i s . This i s a f ac to r both in h i s a b i l i t y to a t t r a c t more c a p i t a l 
and in his ability and motivation to remain in business. Again, 
showing Applicant in the best of all possible lights, he is mar-
ginal if not incapable of maintaining himself financially. 
The major implication of this analysis is that Appli-
cant's financial status is extremely weak at best and probably, 
given the normal probability of business reverses, is unable to 
meet financial obligations which it will incur in a business such 
as a common carrier. The Commission ignored the import of this 
evidence in arriving at its Report and Order of April 9, 1985. 
In view of Applicant's evidence, a Finding that Appli-
cant has the "financial ability" to perform the service sought by 
his application, even if such a finding had been made, would be 
arbitrary and capricious. 
POINT III 
UTAH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE MINORITY STATUS AS A 
BASIS FOR AWARDING CERTIFICATES OF CONVEN-
IENCE AS NECESSITY TO MOTOR CARRIERS. 
In the above-quoted Section 54-6-5, UCA 1953 as 
amended, the Utah legislature has determined the factors which 
the Public Service Commission shall consider in granting a 
certificate of convenience and necessity to a common motor car-
rier. They are: (1) Financial ability to perform the service 
for which authority is requested, (2) the character of the high-
way over which the carrier proposes to travel, the effect thereon 
and upon the traveling public, and (3) the existing transporta-
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tion fac i l i t i e s in the terr i tory proposed t-o be served. fl ' ' U,^ 
i !* inm i ,mf\i on f i n d s t h a t t he A p p l i c a n t I s f i n a n c i a l l y u n a b l e t o p i n -
p e r l y pet 1 ULHI tin MI . i i nimni mini i iiiiii i i i i i i inn if „ m i in J I 
I he highway over wtuel) he p r o p o s e s » o < p e i a t e i s a l r e a d y s u i t i -
« l e n l n , i HI 11 dc i ic*d wi th L ia f f iC i in l l n i \bv g r a n t i n g of the c e r t i -
l i c a t e a p p l i e d t o i w i l l bo, dct i LJIKIIIIII .111 1 1 1 in in r r i n t ' n r p s t r m 
i he p e o p l e of t h e c t a t e of Utah , t h e commission MJILI11 not -pair" 
These . ^ c t o r s a r e ma n d a 1111
 ( 11 w 1 1 1 111 I l 111 11 1 1111 e 
i'. f \if- P u b l i c S e r v i c e rommiss ion g r a n t e d a u t h o r i t y t r oorib nit 
in 111 1 11
 s ui 11.1 I in i IIIIII 1 IIIIII iiriiniiHij a c e r t i f i c a t e of con-
v e n i e n c e and n e c e s s i t y , The code p r o v i s i o n s ar*j di UJ.'-ii 1 0 
p r o t o r t t h e i/nsfomers nf common 1 ' a i r i e r s r a t h e r than In dm 
01 iiuina tu 1 n In MI nil inn y i t l in,ml 111 fijim lit nf " rj *' 1 n t ' r • 
ii t h i t cat 11 t h e P u b l i c S e r v i c e doiiimisbi on o J e a i J / 
pMivf. dcii it j u t h o r i t y by approv ing -1 t r a n s f e r ol a u t h o r i t y 
I 1 ii l e a n t based on hi.« unnm M
 ( In! in . I iinlinu ml I 11 I ' n 
Commiss ion ' s Repor t and Order of April . IJ, I , b e t s out Lh. 
tiinn p 1 "rII 11 I 11 AjiTif I 1 c in ' 1 IIM o b t a i n e d m i n o r i t y b u s i n e s s s u o c - n -
t r a c t s wiLJi Lwo tonL1.act01 1. 11 • "J Jl 1 1 111111 1 111 1 .11 1 11 c t- 11 e s 
t h a t A p p l i c a n t " i s e l i g i b l e to a c c e p t ' s e t a s i d e 1 p o r t i o n s of 
f c d u L d l l , d'liiidpiii 1 Mini ,1 I 11 nf-1 (jii (JIOTPCI - which must be performed ry 
min . , : r -owned I i rms ' I-1 % l 0 nd in 11 "- imn h i . i u i o . ul Law ill 
Commission s t a t e s # c o n c e r n i n g Applicant; „ "II1 ^ e v e r r we do net 
believe we can ignore his status vis-a-vis federally-funded pro-
jects. Whether we agree or disagree with the philosophy embodied 
in the 'set aside' programs, they do exist, and Applicant is in a 
preferred position to obtain such work." (R-97) 
An order approving a transfer of a certificate of con-
venience and necessity based on the minority status of the Appli-
cant is clearly beyond the scope of authority granted by the 
Legislature to the Public Service Commission, and is therefore 
arbitrary and capricious. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff requests that the Report and Order of the 
Public Service Commission/ dated April 9, 1985, be vacated and 
that this matter be remanded to the Commission with instructions 
to enter its order denying the transfer of certificate No. 1468 
to Applicant Bruce Construction. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
^—^Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div. 
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